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Abstract: The notion of automorphism is an essential tool to capture the meaning of any mathemat- 
ical structure. We apply this idea to cooperative games and obtain two interesting characterizations f 
the automorphisms of uch a game: the one, in the complete case, as the permutations of players which 
preserve the (classical) Shapley value; the other, for the general case, as the permutations preserving all
weighted Shapley values. 
1 Rationale 
In game theory, the following question seems of interest: given a game (in 
characteristic function form), under what circumstances can we say that the game 
treats all players (or, perhaps, some particular pair of players) equally? We might 
imagine some tournament director, trying to organize the way a game is 
scheduled, so that, in the end, no losing player might be able to claim that he lost 
"because of the way the tournament was organized". 
Let us say a game is fair if it treats all its players equally. Then the following two 
criteria seem reasonable: 
(a) a sufficient condition for game v to be fair is that v(S) depend only on the 
cardinality of S. 
(b) A necessary condition for game v to be fair is that some accepted measure, 
say the Shapley value, assign equal payoffs to all players. 
Obviously, the first condition (symmetry) implies the second (equality of the 
Shapley value), but the converse is not true. It is the intermediate cases, i.e. games 
v such that ~bi[v ] = ~bfv] for all pairs, but which are not symmetric, that seem 
most interesting. 
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The following two examples, from "real" games, might make the situation 
clear. 
Consider, first, the game of bridge. In such a game, the cards dealt will certainly 
make a difference; the position (i.e. whether one deals or not) possibly also makes 
a difference. Now in a tournament, the difference incards (the luck of the deal) can 
be more or less obviated by duplication of hands; the difference in position is 
obviated by rotating the dealership. With this in mind, much of the influence of 
"luck" has been removed. In theory, then, a bridge tournament would seem to be 
"fair" in every sense of the word. 
Suppose, however, that someone is competing in a singles bridge champion- 
ship. This means an individual, without a partner, is up against all others. In 
a large field, it may be impossible to consider all pairings, simply because of time 
constraints. Thus a losing player might feel (and might indeed be correct in 
feeling) that she lost, not because of inferior play, but because the luck of the draw 
gave her an above-average number of weak partners. (In an analogous extreme 
case, we might hink of a player who refuses to play at a certain club because most 
players already have their set partners, and she finds herself always having the 
same, very weak, partner.) 
In the second place, consider a tennis tournament, played (as most are) 
according to the single elimination rule. One hundred twenty-eight players play 
seven rounds, in each of which half the remaining players lose, so that the seventh 
round consists of only one game between two players. 
In the abstract, once again, this process seems perfectly fair. The strongest 
player will, almost by definition, win each of his seven matches and thus win the 
championship. This does not, however, take into account he fact that, in each 
match, the stronger player is far from certain to win: stronger usually means, 
merely, that he has a better than 1/2 probability of winning the match. 
To see the effects of this, suppose there are three strong players, called G, S, and 
M respectively, and many (125) weak players. Suppose that, in any pairing 
between G, S, and M, either one of the pair has probability 1/2 of winning, and, in 
any pairing between one of these three and one of the remaining players, G, S, or 
M has probability close to 1 of winning. 
The tournament director must now decide on the schedule. Typically, G, S, and 
M will be seeded 1, 2, and 3, in some order. Assume they are in fact seeded in that 
order. Then, in all probability, S and M will meet in one of the semi-finals; the 
winner between these two will meet G in the finals. It is not difficult o see that, in 
such case, G has probability 1/2 of winning, while S and M each have probability 
1/4 of winning. (This does not even take account of the possibility that in the 
semi-finals, S and M might wear each other out, leaving the victor to play 
a relatively fresh G.) Thus, the draw definitely favours G, no matter how fair the 
tournament might, in the abstract, seem. 
In cooperative game theory, a similar situation might well hold. In game v, 
assume two players, i and j, have equal chances, in the sense that ~i[v] = ~j[v]. 
Nevertheless, it may be that, to realize fully his potential, i needs to make 
a coalition with an unpredictable player, h;j is not faced with such a problem. If 
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h does, indeed, act in strange fashion, player i might find herself doing poorly, and 
might well be justified in complaining thatj did better (than i) because i needed to 
deal with a player (h) that acted irrationally. 
In a purely symmetric game (i.e. v(S) depends only on the cardinality of S), 
i cannot logically make this complaint, as, anything j did, i could just as easily 
have done. In other games - even games with transitive automorphism groups -
this might well happen. We prove, in this article, that - assuming this "strange" 
behavior can be modelled by differential weights in the weighted Shapley 
value - the only truly "fair" games are the symmetric games. 
2 Automorphisms and Desirability in Games 
The notion of automorphism is an essential tool in almost all branches of 
Mathematics concerned with some kind of structures. In the case of cooperative 
games, automorphisms are those one-to-one transformations of the set of players 
which leave invariant he characteristic function and, hence, do not alter the "in 
abstracto" strategic situation. 
A natural way to compare the strategic positions of any two players is the 
use of the desirability and indifference relations introduced by Isbell (1956). 
The obvious advantages found in the case that desirability is total (complete) 
give us some justification for calling the games where it occurs, complete 
games. 
On the other hand, the Shapley value is a numerical measure - derived from an 
axiomatic procedure (Shapley, 1953)- which evaluates the differences between 
the players' strategic apabilities. By generalizing it to the so-called weighted 
Shapley values (see, e.g. Kalai and Samet, 1987), one is able to add to the game 
exogenous considerations that very often influence the players' behavior. 
An earlier paper (Carreras, 1984), studied the group of automorphisms of any 
complete simple game. The results there are easily extended to the class of 
complete cooperative games. Sections 2and 3 are devoted to summarizing these, 
showing interesting relationships between the group of automorphisms, the 
desirability and indifference r lations, and the (classical) Shapley value. The main 
result (Theorem 3.3 in this paper) characterizes the automorphisms of such 
a game as the permutations of players which preserve the Shapley value, that 
becomes, then, the characteristic invariant for automorphisms. 
Completeness i  a sufficient condition to obtain this result, but it is not 
a necessary one: any game "irregular" enough to guarantee that all players have 
distinct values trivially satisfies the basic relationship between automorphisms 
and the value. Hence, it does not seem appropriate to ask for a necessary and 
sufficient condition by relaxing completeness. In Section 4 we directly attack the 
general case of cooperative games and, using a recent heorem on separation of 
games by weighted values (Carreras and Owen, 1993), we characterize (in 
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Theorem 4.3) the automorphisms of any cooperative game as those permutations 
of players which preserve all the weighted Shapley values. 
Let N = { 1, 2 .... , n} be a fixed set of players, and let NN be the linear space of all 
cooperative games on N, i.e. functions v:2 N ~ ~ such that v(~b) = 0. 
Let S, be the symmetric group on N. Every permutation O~S, operates on 
games through the map 0* :~fN ~ -~N defined by 
(O*v)(S) = v(O- 1 S) VS cc_ N, Vv6N N. 
This is equivalent to say that (O*v)(OS) = v(S) for any S _c N; thus, the role played 
by Oi (respectively OS) in game O*v is identical to the role played by i (resp. S) 
in v. 
0* is a linear and bijective map, and (0")- 1 = (0-1).. Moreover, (00)* = 0*0* if 
0~S,, and 0* = id (on NN) if, and only if, 0 = id (on N). In other words, the map 
0~-+0" gives an injective linear representation S  ~ Aut(~N). 
Let v~f  N. Its orbit O(v) = {w = O*v for some OeS,} is the set of games on 
N which are isomorphic to v (identical to v up to rearrangements of positions). Its 
isotropy group is 
Aut(v) = {OeSn/O*v = v}, 
and every 0eAut(v) will be called an automorphism of v. This is equivalent to 
saying, simply, that v(OS) = v(S) for every S _c N. 
We will use in Section 4 weight vectors e=(el,c~2 .. . . .  an)eR". Every OeSn 
operates also on vectors, through the map 0*:N" --+ N" defined by 
(0*c0i=c~0 ~i YieN, Vc~eR n. 
This is equivalent to saying that (O'cOo i = c~ i for all i eN  and c~EN", and so the 
weight of player Oi in vector 0*c~ coincides with that of player i in e. 
We will abuse notation and write Ov (respectively 0e) instead of O*v 
(resp. 0"~). 
Theorem 2.1: Let v~N N. Then: 
(a) Aut(v)= S, if, and only if, v is a symmetric game (i.e. v(S)= v(T) when 
ISt=IT[). 
(b) If v is isomorphic to w, their groups of automorphisms are conjugate: 
Aut(v) = 0-1 Aut(w)0 if w = Or. 
(c) IS,: Aut(v)], the index of Aut(v) as a subgroup of S,, coincides with I O(v) I and 
gives then the number of games on N which are isomorphic to v. 
Proof: This proof is straightforward. See also Carreras (1984). [] 
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Remarks 2.2: 
(1) As Theorem 2.1(a) shows, the group does not, in general, determine the 
game. 
(2) The converse of 2.1(b) is not true: let v = uN, the unanimity game on N, and 
let w=v*,  the dual of v. (The dual v* of a game v is defined by 
v*(S) = v(N) - v(N - S) for every S _~ N.) Since both games are symmetric, their 
groups of automorphisms coincide with S,, which is self-conjugate under any 
permutation 0;nevertheless, those games are not isomorphic (we also notice that 
Aut(v*) = Aut(v) for any game v). 
Denote by q):NN ~ N" the Shapley value. The original Shapley symmetry 
axiom can be stated as follows: 
rboi[Ov]=~i[v ], Vi~N, Vv6~N, VO~S,. 
As an immediate consequence we obtain 
Proposition 2.3: For any game v, the Shapley value @Iv] is invariant under 
automorphisms, that is 
~boi[V]=~i[v], VieN, V0~Aut(v). [] 
3 Complete Games: The (Classical) Shapley Value 
Given ve~ N, a binary relation D is defined on N as follows: 
iDj (def) v(Sw{i})>v(Sw{j}) VS~_N-{ i , j}  
(iDj is to read: i is more- or, at least, not less-desirable thanj as a coalition partner). 
It is easy to see that D is reflexive and transitive - a preorder. Thus, the lack of 
antisymmetry is solved by introducing the associated equivalence relation I, 
defined by 
ilj (def) iDj, jDi, 
so that ilj means that v(Sw{i})= v(Sw {j}) for any S ~_ N-  {i,j} (i and j are 
indifferent as partners). As is well known, D induces an ordering in the quotient 
set, formed by the/-classes. It is easy to see that ilj is equivalent to saying that the 
transposition tq is an automorphism of v. 
The other basic problem with desirability is that it is not always total. If any 
two players are comparable by D, we will say that v is a complete game: in this 
case, the/-classes are linearly ordered. 
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Example 3.1: A game v is a weighted majority game if there exist a vector weN" 
and a number q such that 
v(S)={~ if ~sWi>q 
otherwise. 
All weighted majority games are complete, since w i _> wj implies iDj; thus, wi = wj 
implies ilj. 
For any game WNN, its group Aut(v), as a subgroup of S,, operates on N. 
Define the orbit of any player i as Oi(v) = {j = Oi for some 0~Aut(v)}. The (distinct) 
v-orbits give a partition of N, and every orbit is a union of I-classes which have the 
same cardinality. By Proposition 2.3, the Shapley value ~b~[v] is, as a function of/, 
constant on every orbit; in particular, ilj implies that ~b~[v] = ~bj[v] (see also 
Lemma 3.2). The basic difference between a pair of players i,j belonging to the 
same/-class and a pair of players lying within the same orbit is that, in the first 
case, the pure transposition tij evidences that they are in equivalent positions, 
whereas in the second case a more complex automorphism 0 is needed to see this, 
probably moving simultaneously some of (or all) the remaining players (see 
Example 4.5). 
If there is only one orbit, the group-and the game itself-is said to be 
transitive. In this case the Shapley value is constant. 
We state, next, our main results on complete games (Theorem 3.3 and 
Corollary 3.4). As for Lemma 3.2, which preceeds them and applies to any game, 
proofs and essentially analogous to those found in Carreras (1984) for the simple 
case, and hence they will be omitted. 
Lemma 3.2: Let v~N u and i, j eN  be such that iDj. Then, ~i[v] > @j[v]. If, 
moreover, jDi, then q~i[v] > cI)j[v]. [] 
Theorem 3.3: The automorphisms of a complete game v6f# N are the permuta- 
tions of players which leave invariant he Shapley value of the game, i.e. 
Aut(v) = {O~S,,/~oi[V ] = (I)i[v ] v i~g}.  
Moreover, if C1, C 2 .. . . .  C k are the/-classes of v, 
Aut(v)=Scl x Sc2 x ... x Sk~. [] 
Corollary 3.4: Let vef# u be a complete game. Then: 
(a) v-orbits and/-classes coincide. 
(b) r = r if, and only if, iIj holds. 
(c) The Shapley value takes distinct values over distinct v-orbits. 
The combinatorial number ( n ~ gives the number of (d) games on 
\ C I,  C 2,- . . ,  Ck / 
N isomorphic to v. 
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(e) If r is constant as a function of i (in particular: if v is transitive) then v is 
a symmetric game, and whence Aut(v) = S,, which becomes the only transitive 
group of a complete game. [] 
Remark 3.5: Completeness is a reasonable sufficient condition for the Shapley 
value to be the characteristic nvariant for automorphisms. Example 4.5 shows 
that this cannot be guaranteed when the game is not complete. At the same time, 
the reader may provide some game irregular enough so that all players have 
distinct values: the group of automorphisms reduces, then, to {id}, showing that 
completeness i  far from being necessary. 
Given v~N,  let 
0 i=Oi(v)=C twC 2u...wCki ', i=l,2,. . . ,r  
be the distinct v-orbits, expressed as unions of /-classes. Let G(~[vl)= 
{O~S,/CI)oiLv ] = @i[v] VieN} be the group of permutations ofN that preserve 
@[v], and denote by S(X) the group of permutations ofany v-orbit or/-class X. 
Then, we have 
S(C{) ~_ Aut(v) _ h S(Oi) ~ G((i~[-vl)" 
i , j  i=1  
Completeness implies that these four groups coincide; nevertheless, it does not 
seem an easy task to find a weaker (and interesting) condition equivalent to 
Aut(v) = O(~[v]), 
the equality obtained in Theorem 3.3. 
4 The General Case: Weighted Values 
We consider again the problem of characterizing the atitomorphisms of a game, 
now dropping completeness. 
An equivalent form of Theorem 3.3 is as follows: if yen  N is a complete game 
0eAut(v)~=~ ~oi[V] = ~bi[v] VieN. 
Our main result in this section (Theorem 4.3) will take a similar form, using 
weighted values instead of the classical value. 
Lemma 4.1: The weighted Shapley value ~:NN -* R" associated to any c~eR" 
satisfies a "generalized symmetry axiom": 
cI)~ Vi~N, Vvmfqs, VOWS,,. 
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Proof: If we fix i, e and 0, the expression 
depends linearly on v; thus, it suffices to check the equality for v = u s, the 
unanimity game with any S ~ N as a carrier. From Ou s = Uos and applying the 
standard computation ofweighted values for unanimity games (Kalai and Samet, 
1987) it follows that 
(O~)~ if Oi~OS 
~~ = l ~O ~176176 if Oi(~OS. 
Recalling the way 0 operates on games, coalitions and weight vectors, this reduces 
to 
I0  z ~--(i if i t s  
~o~ [Ous] = j~s~j 
if i(~S. 
and thus ~b~ = q~[Us]. [] 
The following lemma is from Carreras and Owen (1993). 
Lemma 4.2: Given any two distinct games v and v' over the set N, there is some 
weight vector c~ such that 
m~[v] # m~[v']. 
Proof: Let w = v - v' # O. Let K _ N be such that w(K) # 0 and, for all T c K, 
w(T) = O. We write 
w= E Cs(W)U~ 
~#Sc_N 
where u s is the unanimity game with carrier S, and 
Cs(W ) = ~ ( -  ly-tw(T). 
T~S 
Then cK(w) = w(K) ~ O, and cr(w) = 0 for all T c K. 
Choose now ~ = 1 for all j~K and ej very large for jeN-  K. Then, for any 
ieK, 
~O;[w]=~+ Y c~(w) 
S~K ~j~S j 
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In this last sum, Cr(W) = 0 for all T c K, and, for all other S, the denominator 
~]j~s ej is very large as S contains at least onejeN - K. Thus the summands can be 
made arbitrarily small, i.e. ~[w]  is the sum of the non-zero term %(w)/k and 
finitely many arbitrarily small terms. It follows that q~[w] must have the same 
sign as cK(w). We therefore have 
9 ~[v - v'] # 0 
and by linearity, 
m7[v] # m7[v'] 
as desired. [] 
Theorem 4.3: Let vefr Then 
0eAut(v) <=> 0~ r VieN, VeeR". 
Proof'. (0) Use Ov -- v and the formula in Lemma 4.1. 
(~) Assume 0r Then Ov # v and so v # 0-lV. By applying the property 
of separation of games by weighted values (Lemma 4.2) some eeN" exists such 
that 
m~[v] # m~[O-~v]. 
Hence, there exists some ieN such that 
mr[v] # ~[0  lv]. 
Using again Lemma 4.1 it follows that 
= ~0i [v] 
and we conclude that there exist some eeR" and some ieN such that 
mgr[~] # mr[~]. [] 
Remark 4.4: The game-separation property may be strengthened (see Carreras 
and Owen, 1993, Note 2) in the sense that e can be taken arbitrarily close to vector 
(1, 1 ... . .  1), whose associated weighted value is precisely the classical Shapley 
value. In the present context it may be interpreted as saying that, for 0 to be an 
automorphism of the game, it must preserve any deviation from the classical 
value, in the sense of Theorem 4.3. 
Example 4.5: Let N = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and let v be the (simple) game generated by the 
circular triads 
{1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4, 5}, {4, 5, 1}, {5, 1, 2} 
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of vertices of a pentagon, that is: 
v (S )=f l  if S contains some circular triad 
otherwise. 
Here the group of automorphisms is Aut(v) = D,o, the dihedral group generated 
by the rotation 1 ~ 2 ~-~ 3F-+4~ 5~ 1 and the symmetry defined by s(i) = 6 - i for 
every i eN .  This group does not contain any transposition, and thus all/-classes 
are singletons; moreover, only iDi for all i eN  is satisfied by D, so that the game 
is not complete. But it is transitive, and hence the Shapley value is constant and 
any permutation-automorphic or not -preserves this value: G(~Ev]) = 
S s =~ Aut(v). 
The difference between G(~[v]) and Aut(v) is made clear by considering 
weighted values: for any 0 e G(~b I-v]) - Aut(v) there exists, according to Theorem 
4.3, some eeR" - i t  may be taken arbitrarily close to (1, 1,..., 1)-such that 
Or where this group is defined similarly to G(~[v]) (recall Remark 3.5). 
More explicitly: to leave aside, e.g. 0 = t12, take 
= (1, 1.1, 1, 1, 0.9) 
(any e of the form c~ = (2, #, 1, 1, 1) does not work); then, we have 
401 Iv] = ~P~ = 0.189, 1 [/)] : 0.200, 0= 
where 0c~ = (1.1, 1, 1, 1, 0.9). 
In fact, Theorem 4.3 states that, for any game v~NN, 
Aut(v) = ~ G(~Ev]). 
~ER n 
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